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[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.

The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).

Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.

For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons.  Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.

So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name.  When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).

What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob".  And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc.  The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.

Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself.  Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end.  I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.

This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.

Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
tags/v0.99.9l^2
Junio C Hamano 14 years ago
parent
commit
d79374c7b5
2 changed files with 159 additions and 58 deletions
  1. +60
    -4
      daemon.c
  2. +99
    -54
      path.c

+ 60
- 4
daemon.c View File

@@ -82,9 +82,63 @@ static void loginfo(const char *err, ...)
va_end(params);
}

static int avoid_alias(char *p)
{
int sl, ndot;

/*
* This resurrects the belts and suspenders paranoia check by HPA
* done in <435560F7.4080006@zytor.com> thread, now enter_repo()
* does not do getcwd() based path canonicalizations.
*
* sl becomes true immediately after seeing '/' and continues to
* be true as long as dots continue after that without intervening
* non-dot character.
*/
if (!p || (*p != '/' && *p != '~'))
return -1;
sl = 1; ndot = 0;
p++;

while (1) {
char ch = *p++;
if (sl) {
if (ch == '.')
ndot++;
else if (ch == '/') {
if (ndot < 3)
/* reject //, /./ and /../ */
return -1;
ndot = 0;
}
else if (ch == 0) {
if (0 < ndot && ndot < 3)
/* reject /.$ and /..$ */
return -1;
return 0;
}
else
sl = ndot = 0;
}
else if (ch == 0)
return 0;
else if (ch == '/') {
sl = 1;
ndot = 0;
}
}
}

static char *path_ok(char *dir)
{
char *path = enter_repo(dir, strict_paths);
char *path;

if (avoid_alias(dir)) {
logerror("'%s': aliased", dir);
return NULL;
}

path = enter_repo(dir, strict_paths);

if (!path) {
logerror("'%s': unable to chdir or not a git archive", dir);
@@ -96,9 +150,11 @@ static char *path_ok(char *dir)
int pathlen = strlen(path);

/* The validation is done on the paths after enter_repo
* canonicalization, so whitelist should be written in
* terms of real pathnames (i.e. after ~user is expanded
* and symlinks resolved).
* appends optional {.git,.git/.git} and friends, but
* it does not use getcwd(). So if your /pub is
* a symlink to /mnt/pub, you can whitelist /pub and
* do not have to say /mnt/pub.
* Do not say /pub/.
*/
for ( pp = ok_paths ; *pp ; pp++ ) {
int len = strlen(*pp);


+ 99
- 54
path.c View File

@@ -131,76 +131,121 @@ int validate_symref(const char *path)
return -1;
}

static char *current_dir(void)
static char *user_path(char *buf, char *path, int sz)
{
return getcwd(pathname, sizeof(pathname));
}

static int user_chdir(char *path)
{
char *dir = path;
struct passwd *pw;
char *slash;
int len, baselen;

if(*dir == '~') { /* user-relative path */
struct passwd *pw;
char *slash = strchr(dir, '/');

dir++;
/* '~/' and '~' (no slash) means users own home-dir */
if(!*dir || *dir == '/')
pw = getpwuid(getuid());
else {
if (slash) {
*slash = '\0';
pw = getpwnam(dir);
*slash = '/';
}
else
pw = getpwnam(dir);
if (!path || path[0] != '~')
return NULL;
path++;
slash = strchr(path, '/');
if (path[0] == '/' || !path[0]) {
pw = getpwuid(getuid());
}
else {
if (slash) {
*slash = 0;
pw = getpwnam(path);
*slash = '/';
}

/* make sure we got something back that we can chdir() to */
if(!pw || chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0)
return -1;

if(!slash || !slash[1]) /* no path following username */
return 0;

dir = slash + 1;
else
pw = getpwnam(path);
}

/* ~foo/path/to/repo is now path/to/repo and we're in foo's homedir */
if(chdir(dir) < 0)
return -1;

return 0;
if (!pw || !pw->pw_dir || sz <= strlen(pw->pw_dir))
return NULL;
baselen = strlen(pw->pw_dir);
memcpy(buf, pw->pw_dir, baselen);
while ((1 < baselen) && (buf[baselen-1] == '/')) {
buf[baselen-1] = 0;
baselen--;
}
if (slash && slash[1]) {
len = strlen(slash);
if (sz <= baselen + len)
return NULL;
memcpy(buf + baselen, slash, len + 1);
}
return buf;
}

/*
* First, one directory to try is determined by the following algorithm.
*
* (0) If "strict" is given, the path is used as given and no DWIM is
* done. Otherwise:
* (1) "~/path" to mean path under the running user's home directory;
* (2) "~user/path" to mean path under named user's home directory;
* (3) "relative/path" to mean cwd relative directory; or
* (4) "/absolute/path" to mean absolute directory.
*
* Unless "strict" is given, we try access() for existence of "%s.git/.git",
* "%s/.git", "%s.git", "%s" in this order. The first one that exists is
* what we try.
*
* Second, we try chdir() to that. Upon failure, we return NULL.
*
* Then, we try if the current directory is a valid git repository.
* Upon failure, we return NULL.
*
* If all goes well, we return the directory we used to chdir() (but
* before ~user is expanded), avoiding getcwd() resolving symbolic
* links. User relative paths are also returned as they are given,
* except DWIM suffixing.
*/
char *enter_repo(char *path, int strict)
{
if(!path)
static char used_path[PATH_MAX];
static char validated_path[PATH_MAX];

if (!path)
return NULL;

if (strict) {
if (chdir(path) < 0)
if (!strict) {
static const char *suffix[] = {
".git/.git", "/.git", ".git", "", NULL,
};
int len = strlen(path);
int i;
while ((1 < len) && (path[len-1] == '/')) {
path[len-1] = 0;
len--;
}
if (PATH_MAX <= len)
return NULL;
}
else {
if (!*path)
; /* happy -- no chdir */
else if (!user_chdir(path))
; /* happy -- as given */
else if (!user_chdir(mkpath("%s.git", path)))
; /* happy -- uemacs --> uemacs.git */
else
if (path[0] == '~') {
if (!user_path(used_path, path, PATH_MAX))
return NULL;
strcpy(validated_path, path);
path = used_path;
}
else if (PATH_MAX - 10 < len)
return NULL;
else {
path = strcpy(used_path, path);
strcpy(validated_path, path);
}
len = strlen(path);
for (i = 0; suffix[i]; i++) {
strcpy(path + len, suffix[i]);
if (!access(path, F_OK)) {
strcat(validated_path, suffix[i]);
break;
}
}
if (!suffix[i] || chdir(path))
return NULL;
(void)chdir(".git");
path = validated_path;
}
else if (chdir(path))
return NULL;

if(access("objects", X_OK) == 0 && access("refs", X_OK) == 0 &&
validate_symref("HEAD") == 0) {
if (access("objects", X_OK) == 0 && access("refs", X_OK) == 0 &&
validate_symref("HEAD") == 0) {
putenv("GIT_DIR=.");
check_repository_format();
return current_dir();
return path;
}

return NULL;


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